178 565 in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

178 565 668 Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in the new schools, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders in China shows that the majority of them came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and had attended modern schools.[12] The labor unions, the peasants' associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new career.

178 70 874 555 565 During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaigns

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12. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

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against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their prestige to their military skill, suggest the reputation acquired by military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists, like Communists elsewhere, claim adherence to orthodoz Marxist teachings. They analyze the existing social structure in China in terms of the theory of class struggle and insist on the inevitability of a classless society. In the name of evolving toward this state they justify the liquidation of certain segments of the Chinese population "which stand in the way of the regime." Doing so, they cause changes in the social structure of China.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included

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668 under way, membership in the Peasants' Association increased rapidly. For example, during the initial stages of land reform, membership in the Eastern Szechwan Special District rose from 455,990 to 619,000, an increase of 30 per cent.[52] The number of "poor peasants" who entered the associations also increased rapidly. In the Northern Szechwan Special District, "poor peasants" made up 65 per cent of the membership of the peasants' associations and 70 per cent of that of the militia. In addition, they represented 80 per cent of the membership in hsiang governments and militia units.[53]

701 668 The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people.[54] Prior to the Communist conquest, there were no militia units in Southwest China. Although Communist forces immediately set about building up a militia, only 500,000 recruits had been enrolled by 1950. Central control of the new units was not established

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51. (continued) by national minorities and in some parts of Kweichow. See New China Daily, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 2; Sept. 28, 1952, p. 1; May 10, 1952, p. 1; and Oct. 2, 1951, p. 2.

52. Ibid., Oct. 2, 1951, p. 3.

53. Ibid., Oct. 3, 1951, p. 2.

54. For a study of the militia, see Li Tang, Militia of Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

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701 668 until 1952, following the completion of land reform. At the present time, the militia of Southwest China is far smaller than that of other regions.

The duties of the militia in peace time are to assist the public security forces in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintanence of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

668 2. Consolidation Period: 1952-53. As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established, but challenged, in the rural areas. Party organizations had not yet been established in many rural areas. Even where they existed, they generally were weak and ineffective. Party indoctrination was neglected, with the result that Party members acted like dictators and Party leaders became confused. In order to remedy this situation, the Party launched its membership drive of 1952 and sought to

625 Other units such as a cadre school, border public security bureaus, and forced labor batallions were also under the department's jurisdiction. Public security bureaus were organized within administrative districts and municipalities. County bureaus were empowered to establish security stations for the strengthening of public security work in ch'ü and hsiang, and they were placed in charge of detention houses and prisons.

B. Public Security in the Rural Areas

625 701 During the land reform period, rural security relied on peasant associations and the militia to enforce decrees and destroy the old rural system, to crush the intelligence agencies controlled by the Kuomintang, to suppress banditry, and to eliminate landlords and "despots."

625 701 669 At the time of the Suppression-of-Counter-revolutionaries Movement in the cities, climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia,

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625 the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering
• 701 of cattle. Communist authorities in the
669 Southwest China region called for the strengthening of rural public security.[20] Village committees, composed of from 3 to 11 members, were organized, and public security teams were formed.[21]

The extent of rural unrest was indicated by Wen-hui Liu, deputy from the province of Szechwan, at the second session of the National People's Congress.[22] He reported destruction of agricultural implements, sabotage of a dam, murder of Communist cadres and activists, arson, and impairment of relationships between the Han and the minority groups.

In August 1953, bands of armed police were transferred from the military command to the public security agencies in an attempt to strengthen rural public security.

C. Public Security in the Cities

625 The maintenance of public order and

20. New China Daily, June 29, 1952, p. 1, and Oct. 9, 1952, p. 3.
21. People's Daily, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 1.
22. Ibid., July 29, 1955, p. 5.

imposed by the Communist regime are likewise
651 unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, initiated at the end of 1953, taxes and regulates the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations. The transformation of private businesses into elements of state-owned enterprises is a major cause of discontent among the business class.

Public obligations imposed upon the people are a further cause of public discontent. The average peasant is required to perform duties for the state periodically and on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. Young persons in the villages
651 are required to participate in military training
701 and to perform military service whenever the
● state deems it necessary. All railways are

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constantly patrolled, and each village near the right-of-way must maintain a specially organized force for this purpose and participate in the guard duty for a 72-hour period every month.[40] In addition, the village maintains a militia in which all the young residents must serve. Besides training or participating in the unit's cultural and indoctrination activities, the militia patrols key areas in the village, guards government grain, helps in loading it for shipment, and assists in keeping the village free of bandits. Misuse of the militia by the Southwest China Military Command in 1953 was criticized as having wasted 24,700 man-hours per day.[41]

Similar public and military services are required of city dwellers. They must engage in military training, participate in the local military unit's cultural and organizational activities, and serve on patrols in their own or neighboring areas whenever needed.

Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations

40. Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 4.

41. Report of the Second Southwest China Militia Conference, Ibid., May 20, 1953, p.1.

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631 officials who live at Yün-nan Fu, viz.: the Fan-t'ai or treasurer, the Nieh-t'ai or provincial judge, the Liang-tao or grain-tax commissioner, and the Yen-tao or salt commissioner. These four with the Viceroy form a board to settle important matters.

• 701 The chief military authority in Yün-nan is the T'i-t'ai or provincial commander-in-chief, whose residence is not at the capital, but at Ta-li Fu. Under him are five officers of the rank of Chên-t'ai or general who have their head-quarters at different places in the province and command large districts which do not necessarily correspond with the civil administrative divisions. Under them again are various officers distributed all over the province, their rank corresponding to the size or importance of the garrisons they command. The lowest military officials are those known as hsün-kuan (pronounced *sin-kuan* in western Yün-nan). These men correspond nearly to our police sergeants, and are placed in some of the large villages with from four to eight men under them, in charge of a small circle.

The soldiers are divided into regulars and irregulars. The former are locally recruited men, armed with any sort of weapon, and kept up principally for police purposes. They are hardly expected to do any fighting. The irregulars or "braves" are the men who are sent out where there is any fighting to be done. Many of them are recruited from other provinces, those in Yün-nan coming principally from Hu-nan and Ssŭ-ch'uan. They are the only part of the military forces who can be called soldiers[1].

206 On the 15th January, the day after my arrival in T'êng-yüeh, a Chinese telegraph clerk who knew a few words of English came to see me, and told me that Mr Jensen, a Dane in the Chinese telegraph service, was expected to arrive at T'êng-yüeh that day, and asked me to change my quarters to the telegraph office. He also told me that P'êng, the Chinese official who had accompanied us in our search for the "gates" the previous year, was now in charge of the T'êng-yüeh telegraph office. He knew nothing whatever of telegraphy, but this is considered a matter of no importance: in fact in many of the Chinese

[1] This was written before the formation of the Lu Chün, the modern army of China.

5: Davies G-5 (1894-1900) 1909 AF16 Southwest China AF16

797 In these remarks I hope I have said nothing which will give offence to either sect. I shall always remember the missionaries I have met in western China, both French and English, as men devoted to the cause they have taken up, and always ready to offer hospitality and assistance to the traveller.

000 Père Bourgain returned to Tê-ch'ang the next day, so I had not the pleasure of his company any further. Our march of 19 miles was somewhat monotonous, the plain broadening out and becoming more level. The weather which had been a little warm quite changed again, and the snow on the hillsides was very nearly down to the plain.

361 We slept at Ma-tao-tzŭ, and on the following morning, sending my mules straight on by the main road, I made a circuit myself to have a look at Ning-yüan Fu[1]. This town lies three or four miles to the east of the road, separated from it by a low spur which runs down from the eastern hills. It is consequently not so flourishing a place commercially as some of the smaller towns which lie right on the main road, but officially it is the most important town in the district. It must contain nearly 4000 houses and is surrounded by a good wall three miles or so in perimeter. Just to the east of the city is a good-sized lake some five miles long. The story is that there was formerly a town there which was destroyed when the lake was formed by an earthquake or some volcanic disturbance.

• 701 After leaving Ning-yüan I was passed on the road by a Lo-lo chief with some of his soldiers. He was the T'u-ssŭ[2] of T'ung-an-chou, a place I had passed through a little time before between the Yangtze and Hui-li Chou. A year or two before this he had got up a sort of rebellion against the Chinese authorities, but the Hui-li mandarin was considered by the Chinese Government as partly to blame for this outbreak, so the T'u-ssŭ was pardoned on condition that he would fight for the Chinese against the Independent Lo-los who had lately been raiding. This he was nothing loth to do, as he is what in the dialect of western China they call a "kuai jên," "a bad man," i.e. fond of fighting. So in the recent hostilities the Chinese troops had been held in reserve while the Lo-lo levies had

[1] Also called Chien-ch'ang Fu. Hence the name of this valley.
[2] Local chief.

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done most of the fighting for them. This is an arrangement that seems to suit everybody, for as the Chinese put it, "The Lo-los are stupid men who are not afraid of dying."

The T'u-ssŭ keeps up a small standing army, and every one of his men that I saw was armed with a breech-loader. He also appears to recognise the importance of discipline, for a man goes in front of his troops with a red placard on which is written the T'ung-an-chou "Army Act."

For not obeying bugle calls—To be beheaded.

For being drunk and fighting—To be put in the stocks.

For losing arms or ammunition—To be beheaded.

For destroying the property of civilians—To be beheaded.

For being absent at night—To be put in the stocks.

For gambling—To be put in the stocks.

For extorting money by threats—To be put in the stocks.

For taking a wrong rifle—To be put in the stocks.

For buying things and refusing to pay—To be put in the stocks.

We slept the night at Li-chou which in spite of its name is not an official town of the *chou* class, though it is a prosperous commercial place.

The following day, the 22nd February, we had another level march to the town of Lu-ku which is built where the two sources of the An-ning Ho meet, one coming down from Mien-ning Hsien, and the other and smaller branch from the Hsiao-hsiang-ling pass.

I had now been along nearly the whole of the Chien-ch'ang valley and a little later, on my road to Mien-ning Hsien, I was able to see the rest of it, so I will summarise here my observations on it.

The plain stretches from a little beyond Mien-ning Hsien in the north down to the village of Hsin-kai-tzŭ in the south. It is, therefore, about 110 miles in length, but has not an average width of more than two miles. Its elevation at Mien-ning is 6,250 feet, and from this it slopes down by a scarcely perceptible descent to some 4,200 feet in the south.

Besides the two official cities of Ning-yuan Fu and

his post two secretaries, a cook and four servants from the lowland; 000 the Chinese never take their wives along when they go so far into the interior of Tibet. But he was loaded down with so many goods that at first I took him to be a wholesale merchant. He had put all his cash into tea and cotton and of course traveled on ula which was furnished by the subjects of the Ming tscheng tu se. Since he had brought along only wooden saddles and no saddle blankets and did not want to lose time, the Chinese servants forced the ula men to strap the sharp-edged saddles on the bare backs of the poor animals. Tears were streaming down the faces of the Tibetans and they threw themselves on their knees in front of the Chinese, but the gentlemen rode mercilessly off without saddle padding. They were, after all, only ula animals!

After the Leang tai, officers from Yünnan and Hunan moved into my hotel. Every day new reinforcements arrived from down below. From dawn to dusk recruits were drilled in the temples and yamen, there were exercises in the handling of arms and there was target practice. The soldiers were armed with old European repeater guns and made a good impression. (1)

C T 701

1. The punitive expedition of the Anglo-Indian government which was carried out with such forbearance was a reply to the challenging refusal of the Dalai Lama. It came to an end in August 1904, under Younghusband with his entry into Lhasa and the Potala. Therewith the weakness of the Chinese position in those lands was clearly proven. In order to regulate matters at last, the Peking court sent off a special minister in 1904 whose duty it was to introduce a more rigid rule. Before this minister Feng had set foot on the actual land of the Dewa schung of Lhasa, however, he was shot in April 1905, along with his band of riders by the Dschraba of the Ba tang monastery. The monks of the Gelugba sect no longer wanted the Chinese to gain supreme authority. The rebellion spread rapidly toward Li tang and the Mekong and Yangtze Valley and as far as Aten tse in the northern part of Yünnan.

C T 175

The active Tschao ör fong who was at that time still dao tai - during the Chinese revolution he was well-known governor of Szechwan and as such was beheaded in 1912 in the streets of Tscheng tu fu by the Kuo ming